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The conceit that either mind is reducible to matter or that mind is
utterly ethereal is rooted in a mind-versus-matter dichotomy that can
be characterized as the modern error, a fatally flawed fallacy rooted in
the philosophy and culture of nominalism. A Peircean semiotic out-
look, applied to an understanding of social life, provides a new and
full-bodied understanding of semiosis as the bridge between mind
and matter, and human biology and culture. I begin by first delineating
the false divide and showing Charles Sanders Peirce’s alternative to it,
then explore the implications of a semiotic approach to mind as trans-
action, then consider the self-transcending nature of the human body-
mind. Finally I outline my ecological, biosemiotic account of mind,
which reveals that, indeed, mind matters, and in ways that unexpect-
edly resemble the forms of animism that characterized the hunting-
gathering foragers through whom we anatomically modern humans
emerged. 
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THE GREAT DIVIDE
 
What is Matter?—Never Mind.
What is Mind?—No Matter.
 
—F. J. Furnivall
 
The great divide of modern thought is whether mind is real or not. Materialists argue
that mind is simply matter, understandable by and reducible to physical laws. The
other side tends to argue that mind is that which constructs the laws of nature. In his
 
Critique of Pure Reason
 
 Kant exemplified this view, that matter is merely a “sensory
manifold,” given form by the faculties of knowing that constitute the human mind.
Contemporary social constructionist frameworks echo the Kantian view in holding
that mind is conditioned by one’s cultural beliefs and conventions, not by an external
reality. The philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949:26), criticizing the divide as it showed
 
Direct all correspondence to Eugene Halton, Department of Sociology, 810 Flanner Hall, University
of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556; 
 
e-mail
 
: Eugene.W.Halton.2@nd.edu.
 
 120
 
Symbolic Interaction
 
Volume 31, Number 2, 2008
 
itself in Descartes’ dichotomy of 
 
res cogitans
 
 (thinking substance) versus 
 
res extensa
 
(extended substance), termed it “the ghost in the machine” and sought to eliminate
the ghost. But these are not merely philosophical distinctions without practical im-
port. The contemporary world is haunted by this ghost-in-the-machine dichotomy.
Indeed, the contemporary world is largely the incarnation of this dichotomy, mind-
ing itself into matter. 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotic philosophy reveals the mind-versus-matter
dichotomy of the modern era as the modern error, as a fatally flawed fallacy
rooted in the philosophy and culture of nominalism.
 
1
 
 More than any other phi-
losopher, including the other pragmatists, Peirce revealed the false premises of
modern thought and the basis for a new outlook. I must necessarily introduce
some technical terminology into the discussion, such as 
 
nominalism
 
, 
 
semiosis
 
,
 
mind as transaction
 
, and 
 
bubble boy theories of meaning
 
, because they help focal-
ize the ideas. So I beg the reader’s patience. My claim is that a serious consider-
ation of the human self and its institutions requires a full-bodied understanding
of semiosis, of sign-action, as the bridge between mind and matter, and human
biology and culture. 
I begin by delineating the divide and showing Peirce’s alternative to it, then ex-
plore implications of a semiotic approach to mind as transaction and the self-
transcending nature of the human body-mind—for it truly is a body-mind that we
inhabit, however clumsy the current English-language-hyphenated way of express-
ing this may be. Finally I outline my ecological, biosemiotic account of mind that re-
veals that indeed, mind matters, and in ways that unexpectedly resemble the forms
of animism that characterized the hunting-gathering foragers through whom we an-
atomically modern humans emerged (Halton 2005). 
Sociologists, especially those identified as symbolic interactionists, tend to shy
away from biological aspects of mind, self, and society, despite the centrality to
Mead and the other pragmatists of naturalistic ways of conceiving mind, self, and
society that do full justice to cultural life.
 
2
 
 The biosemiotic approach I am develop-
ing is an attempt to argue for a broadened place for signification in social life. I not
only claim that purely conventionalist accounts of signification are overly narrow
but propose a radical decentering from the encephalopod assumption that a mind is
something in a head, to one that places the head, the body, the self, the institutions
of society, and nature in the signifying being of mind. 
The dichotomy of biological reductionism and cultural reductionism is a con-
sequence of philosophical and cultural nominalism, and remains false, regardless
of which side of the divide one is on. Dramatic and ritual-like processes perco-
late up from our deep biosemiotic nature. The human body-mind is biological
and cultural; biology and culture are literally symbolically interactive in the human
body-mind. 
The idea that mind is simply brain functioning, and that humans, in the barbaric
phrase of the computer scientist Marvin Minsky, are simply “meat machines,” is not
only patently false but represents a complete inversion of the evolutionary process
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by which human brains and minds developed. I take the brainiac, meat-machine
view as pathological and, as such, a key indicator of the likely terminal mental illness
of civilized humanity. 
Materialism is a state of mind. It is the delusive fiction of mentally derived physi-
cality, sense without sensuousness, law without semiosis. Scientific materialism is
rooted in a conception of the universe as basically composed of lifeless matter in
motion, out of which life springs by chance. Yet consider that the word 
 
materialism
 
springs from the Latin 
 
mater
 
, the shoot-producing trunk of a tree, and a transferred
use of the life-giving capacity that defines a mother. Modern materialism, as such,
can be considered a complete etymological inversion of the term 
 
mater
 
. And we
might view its universe as the complete inversion of that of traditional pygmies,
who live in what they call 
 
Mother Forest
 
, a variescent presence. What if the pygmies
got it right, and the universe, or multiverse, or All, or whatever we call it, is rela-
tional? What if it does mind? What if such a view could be reconciled with a scien-
tific outlook? 
The materialist takes the uninterpreted fact as the starting point, a thing that can
be pointed at. But a fact is not an evanescence of existence: that would be super-
natural. 
 
A fact is a social object of interpretation in the long run
 
, an appeal to further
interpretation and determination, to what Peirce conceived of as an unlimited com-
munity of inquiry, which it also helps determine. Yet materialism would hold that an
isolate fact is an ultimate, and incognizable. That is materialist magic. So-called
scientific realism is a way to exclude reality through fetishistic attachment to precise
material portions of it. 
Postmodernists tend to take interpretation as the starting point and treat objec-
tivity as the product of interpretation. As Friedrich Nietzsche (1967:481) put it,
“There are no facts, only interpretations.” A fact is not an isolate object, calling out
for interpretation, but is already an interpretation. But Nietzsche was not a post-
modernist. Regardless of what Nietzsche meant by “facts,” interpretation need not
imply relativism. Nor is it necessarily reducible to arbitrary conventions of interpre-
tation. Those are simply the views resulting from the false mind-versus-matter di-
chotomy that characterizes nominalism, with its assumption of a primal object and
primal subject needing to be mediated, but only ex post facto.
In contrast, the mediational or semiotic view of mind, self, society, and science,
most deeply articulated in Peirce’s philosophy, rejects materialism, positivism, and
all other views that would claim a thing-in-itself outside sign-mediation as illogical
for holding something incognizable as a basis for cognition.
 
3
 
 Peirce’s view also en-
tails rejecting forms of social constructionism that claim that all signification is ei-
ther conventional or contingent as being too narrow. In such views the human self is
typically the passive product of what has made it, yet in the Peircean perspective—
and those of the other pragmatists—the self can self-construct. Or self-destruct. I
hope that you and I, dear reader, if we have any spark of life left, are more than sim-
ply a conditioned artifact. You and I, if we still spark, create our culture and our
selves, as well as participate in cultural norms and conditioning. We are mind-body
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builders: social construction workers whose building blocks are real signs of life.
The capacity for spontaneous life and intelligence, bubbling into being, is more than
a mere function of evolutionary imperative and cultural conditioning, though it may
involve both. It is a reality of the fountain of life, in my view, not to be reduced to
the Procrustean bed of the modern rational-mechanical mind. 
What I call the 
 
bubble boy theories of meaning
 
 (after the boy who had to be kept
in a germ-free bubble, unable to touch or be touched by the world) claim that
meaning is purely conventional or contingent. These theories stem from assump-
tions of nominalism, and many are influenced by Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916)
semiology. These views typically exclude nonconventional modes of signification,
and one reverts back to something like the Kantian form-versus-content distinction:
meaning as ethereal form versus meaningless content of forms, or as contingent
recombination of forms. Émile Durkheim’s ([1915] 1965, 1973) discussions of col-
lective representations, in which “the part of matter” used in the representation is
reduced to a minimum, and in which the body is pitted against the social and the
representational, also exemplifies bubble boyism. There is of course arbitrariness in
conventional representation, yet he grossly underestimated the place of living habitat
as a real element in the mind of the Australian and other hunter-gatherers he frequently
referred to. 
Durkheim’s conceptualist view of collective representations might have socialized
Kant’s structuralist faculties of knowledge bubble, but Durkheim remained incapable
of breaking out of the knowledge bubble to see that the “elementary form” of religion,
revealed in hunter-gatherer societies, is the living effort to connect to and participate
in the all-surrounding life of ongoing creation. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1926:129–30) saw
this experiential dimension of meaning making more clearly than Durkheim in his
discussions of 
 
participation mystique
 
, which concerns how the hunter-gatherer mind
lives nature “by feeling itself participate in it” rather than simply objectifying it con-
ceptually. I call this consciousness 
 
animate mind 
 
and claim that it remains organically
present in the contemporary body-mind, despite the vast transformations of con-
sciousness introduced in civilizational and modern life (Halton 2007). 
Similarly, Peirce’s semiotic can encompass the extraconceptual nature of signifi-
cation involved in experiential representations, as can the transactional philoso-
phies of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. In the bubble boy views, however,
meaning cannot touch or be touched by the world. That is why they are inadequate,
in my view, to account for the full-bodied life of signs.
Peirce, who was also the primary inventor of mathematical logic, intended his
semiotic as a broad theory of logic (Sowa 2006). Here I am drawing implications of
that logic for social thought. I have written at length in other works on the technical
aspects of Peircean semiotic, its differences from Saussurean models, its radical dis-
tortion by Charles Morris at midcentury into a positivist model fundamentally at
odds with Peirce’s carefully conceived logical exposition, its points of continuity with
Mead and Dewey, and the tendency of semioticians to focus on technical terminol-
ogy at the expense of the pragmatic import of the ideas (Rochberg-Halton 1986;
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Halton 2004b). I do not wish to dwell on the technical aspects of this history or the
terminology here, but simply to develop some implications of a Peircean semiotic
and pragmatic outlook for understanding social life.
 
AS SIMPLE AS ONE, TWO, THREE
 
Peirce claimed to be a “backwoodsman” exploring semiotic, or doctrine of signs,
and his terminological forest of symbols can be difficult to comprehend, as can the
concepts he articulates. But once you get it, it’s as simple as one, two, three. 
In about 1898 Peirce adopted his three modalities of being, which he sometimes
called the three universes and which permeate his philosophy: being considered as
first, as second, or as third. Imagine we live simultaneously in three universes: first,
the universe of possibility, of present quality, of chance, that is, of firstness as first-
ness; second, the universe of existence, of brute otherness apart from law, of sec-
ondness as secondness; and third, of generality, of law, of triadic relation, of semio-
sis or sign-action, of thirdness as thirdness. As Peirce put it in 1908, “The third
Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish
connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Uni-
verses. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign—not the mere body of the
Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign’s Soul, which has its
Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such,
too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such
is a living constitution—a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social ‘movement’”
(Peirce 1931–34:6.455). 
Thirdness is a broad category indeed, comprising the realm of signs. Peirce
viewed human conduct as sign-habits. All signs are inferences, and an inference is
neither simply a material thing nor a dematerialized “thinking substance” but a spa-
tiotemporal activity. Thus a sign is an inferential, triadic process of (1) sign repre-
senting (2) object to (3) an interpretant. There can be signs of firstness, or icons,
secondness, or indexes, and thirdness, or symbols. A sign is inherently dialogical,
addressing itself to an interpretant, which itself is a sign addressing itself to an inter-
pretant, ad infinitum.
 
4
 
An utterance is not simply something unreal until it is heard and interpreted; it is
an utterance-sign, representing itself in its own triadic nature to that which would
interpret it. Like every sign, it involves a modality of being not limited to “existing”
in a moment but pragmatically in the conceivable consequences (or interpretations,
or “hearings”) it engenders. Just as every sign is an inferential process occurring in
time, or semiosis, every sign involves its futurity, its conceivable consequences. The
name for this way of conceiving signification is pragmatism, as Peirce originally
conceived it.
Further, the continuing process of interpretation involves further determination
of the object through the self-correcting process of interpretation known as inquiry.
That opinion that would be reached at the end of inquiry (whether or not actually
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reached) is what Peirce calls truth, and its object, the real. Hence reality is more
than existence (or secondness); it is of the nature of a general sign (or thirdness).
This theory involves the idea that reality is of the nature of a would-be, a condi-
tional, not simply an actual. Can we say that the untested diamond you have never
seen is hard, scientifically? Peirce’s doctrine of realism argues that if it were a dia-
mond, then it would really be shown to have the hardness of a diamond if scratched:
scientific inference includes the conditional as an aspect of objectivity, and interpre-
tation as a process of continual inquiry. 
Hence in its deepest articulation, as Peirce framed it, the semiotic view is a scien-
tific realism at odds with the modern materialist conception of realism, which Peirce
claimed was illogical. Peircean semiotic realism, with its view of interpretation as con-
tinuing inquiry, involves an outlook Peirce also described as “concrete reasonable-
ness,” wherein mind in general, not simply as human mind, is an emergent evolution-
ary capacity capable of progressive embodiment in the nature of things. 
My outlook is that of a semiotic realist, but also a fantastic realist, who takes the
biopoetic passions and dramatic expressions of social life—of human and other
species—quite seriously. Human development and human social life are marked by
narrative-like processes, many of which are purely conventional but some of which
are biological as well. Take the biosocial drama of mother-infant bonding and sepa-
ration between one and one-half and three years of age as one example: literally the
essence of mammal, bodying forth from the infant’s genome, yet also with a specific
human biodevelopmental trajectory and human varieties of conventionalizing it.
This narrative of empathic touching, gazing, and the emergent ability to “No!” the
world by the infant results in a self capable of empathy and autonomy. Without it
the self is left empathy deficient, as in clinical narcissistic disturbance, capable of
cognizing the world but not of fully feeling it: the emotional bubble boy or girl. 
Communicative mind is a semiotic process, involving material processes, though
not reducible to them. Thought is in signs, not locked in a brain, even when involv-
ing brain. In which “lobe” do you carry the conceivable consequences of your con-
duct, for there, pragmatically speaking, is to be found the real world. All scientific
observation depends on it, on future conceivable consequences, without which any
observation is rendered meaningless.
Peirce, the founder of philosophical pragmatism, rejected Cartesian dualism. His
articles of 1868, published when he was still in his twenties, demolished the Carte-
sian foundations of modern philosophy and of foundationalism. He showed that sci-
ence does not require foundations but only continuing self-corrective interpretation
in an unlimited community of inquiry for securing fallible, objective truth (Rochberg-
Halton 1986). He argued instead for a semiotic conception of meaning and for what
he would later call pragmatism, which he even later had to distinguish as “pragmat-
icism,” because people who thought to develop his idea of pragmatism (the “Peirce
snatchers”) just didn’t get it. 
Pragmaticism claims that meaning bodies forth in conceivable consequences; in
Peirce’s words from 1906, “Pragmaticism makes thinking to consist in the living
 
 Mind Matters
 
125
 
inferential metaboly of symbols whose purport lies in conditional general resolu-
tions to act” (Peirce 1931–34:5.402n3). Restated, mind bodies forth and becomes
embodied in conceivable consequences of signs. Hence mind, considered from
pragmaticism, includes the conditional as real, and not only the existential. 
In the real world, thought and signs occur in a spatiotemporal field that involves
the brain, but is not limited to it. As Peirce put it, we are in mind, like a bicycle can
be said to be in motion. Minding is not imposed on the universe but is an emergent
aspect of it. To reduce a thought or a sign to a brain function would be like analyz-
ing the typographic components of these word-images you are reading to under-
stand their meaning, as absurd as dissecting a whale to understand 
 
Moby-Dick
 
 or
chemically analyzing a painting to understand its artistic meaning. The meanings of
thoughts and other signs are found in conceivable consequences they engender,
whose signs are often found in places other than your brain. They are found in conduct
and objects and times—in those consequences that make the pragmatic meaning—
that go beyond brainpans. 
The essence of a sign is to represent something to another sign, its interpretant.
Mind is not reducible to a synaptic gospel, sparking between the neurons (marvel-
ous though that electrochemical dance may be!), for it lives in the good news of the
semiotic gospel, whose pragmatic fruits include the would-be interpretation not yet
actualized (Halton 2004a, 2004b). Let us explore further some of the ways in which
mind matters meaning into being.
 
MIND AS TRANSACTION
 
That conclusion to which I find myself driven, struggle against it as I
may, I briefly express by saying that the inkstand is a REAL thing. Of
course, in being real and external, it does not in the least cease to be
a purely psychical product, a generalized percept, like everything of
which I can take any sort of cognizance.
 
—Charles Sanders Peirce
 
Mind viewed as a sign-process is a transaction, a spatiotemporal activity. The living
human self involves a triadic transaction with its environment, not a dyadic stimulus-
response. I first introduced a triadic, semiotic, transactional model of the self in 1981
in 
 
The Meaning of Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self
 
. I use the term 
 
transaction
 
in the sense in which Dewey (1938) proposed it in his book 
 
Logic: The Theory of In-
quiry
 
. The terms 
 
interaction
 
 and 
 
symbolic interaction
 
 still suggest a primordial subject
(individual or collective) or object brought together in an interaction, rather than
those terms as emergent from the triadic transaction. In this context transaction can
be viewed as a triad of self-object-interpretation or of agent-patient-enacted.
Mind, then, is not limited to the brain or corporeal organism, but is literally in trans-
action with its environment, inner and outer, through its own bodily organs of awareness.
As Mead (1934:223) put it, “Our contention is that mind can never find expression, and
could never have come into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment. . . . If
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mind is socially constituted, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must
extend as far as the social activity or apparatus of social relations extends; and hence
that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs.”
Or, I might add, by the neurons of the individual organism to which it belongs. 
The self as a transaction with the environment is mediated by what I term the
“membrane of the self,” that boundary organ of communication through which the
self (1) qualitatively attunes itself to its environment, (2) selectively attends to and
filters out various aspects of its environment, and (3) enacts its purposes in transac-
tion with its environment. Those purposes may involve composite modalities of self,
which, influenced by Peirce, I have termed 
 
the personal self
 
,
 
 the social self
 
, and
 
 the
cosmic self 
 
(Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Rochberg-Halton 1986;
Halton and Rumbo 2007:297–318). I shall return to these modalities of self, but first
let us consider Peirce’s three modalities of consciousness. 
Peirce distinguished these modalities in describing his philosophy of synechism,
or continuity: carnal consciousness, social consciousness, and spiritual conscious-
ness. If carnal consciousness is the bodily life of signs—alive in transaction with the
social environment—social consciousness is how “a man’s spirit is embodied in oth-
ers, and which continues to live and breathe and have its being very much longer
than superficial observers think” (Peirce [1893] 1998:3). It is the life of signs of the
body social, in which we are participant. Suppose, for example, I perished after tap-
ping out these words you are gazing at. They, and hence a part of me, would live and
breathe as social consciousness, independent of my carnal consciousness, through
you. They would continue minding both as signs and as conceivable consequences,
as Peirce also does in this discussion, which can also be considered as one of the
conceivable consequences of pragmaticism. 
By claiming that humans are capable of spiritual consciousness, Peirce does not
mean religion in the everyday sense but participation in truth, however that comes
about. His doctrine of synechism is an aspect of his scientific philosophy, though he
saw it as conducive to eventually reconciling religion and science. In Peirce’s semi-
otic sense of “spiritual,” the life of science is an example of spiritual consciousness.
It is inquiry into the truth of those eternal forms such, as Peirce the mathematician
would put it, that mathematics makes us aware of, or of those generals that result
from a specific research, or in a different context, that art manifests. Science and art
“parasitize” the bodies they incorporate, as all mind, in mattering, might be said to
do. When you learn social science, for example, the community of inquiry of which
you are a part can be said to be parasitizing you from an institutional perspective,
incorporating its corpus of signs through you. Its spiritual consciousness lives in its
individual members and in the developing ends they serve and even help create.
Spiritual consciousness is thus a perspective in which to view how real truths mani-
fest in social practices. Mathematics may provide a tidy example, but what about social
sciences, which seem, well, way fuzzier?
As I see it, a social scientist would be one who analyzes social realities such as he
or she observes them, not in the eternal sunshine of mathematical forms but in the
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muck of life. I remember being at a conference at Berkeley on Robert Bellah and
his coauthors’ book 
 
The Good Society
 
. One of the data from their previous book,
 
Habits of the Heart
 
, was in the audience and argued with an interpretation! Mathe-
maticians don’t seem to have that problem of data speaking back. Yet truths are still
ascertainable in the tangle of life, however roughly hewn by the social sciences.
Only they may be based in an overall rightness of a narrative or ethnography, in
overall compellingness rather than unfalsifiable precision. 
Peirce ([1898] 1998:39), the founder of pragmatism, argued that in tending to
treat arts and sciences as practical, we would use them as an individual man
 
uses the deer, which I yesterday saw outside of my window; and just as in writing
this I am burning great logs in a fireplace. But we are barbarians to treat the deer
and the forest trees in that fashion. They have ends of their own, not related to
my individual stomach or skin. So, too, man looks upon the arts from his selfish
point of view. But they, too, like the beasts and the trees, are living organisms,
none the less so for being parasitic to man’s mind.
 
Now here is a stake, poised to strike at the heart of one of modern materialism’s
assumptions: that arts and sciences primarily serve practical human purposes. This
assumption also manifests in evolutionary views that all mind, all reasonableness, is
merely a function of survival. Shift the perspective from anthropocentric to cosmi-
centric, and you can see how arts and sciences, living parasitically through the hu-
man mind as institutions spawned from it but not limited to it, may have ends that
the human mind serves, apart from practicality. Or go further and consider how
they helped create the human mind as well. For example, humans did not invent
music but evolved into being immersed in it, in birdsong and other living audio
manifestations of ecological mind (Halton 2007). So it is not so farfetched to view
arts and sciences as real beings that can evolve toward “concrete reasonableness.”
This is a keynote of Peirce’s philosophy of science, of pragmaticism, and of what he
means by spiritual consciousness. The object of inquiry, namely, truth, determines
the community of inquiry in the long run, and such determination may not be lim-
ited to humans as they have evolved thus far. 
Peirce’s idea of “endless semiosis” denotes the continuum of sign interpretation,
not limited to the actual individuals who make up the community of interpretation
but inclusive of 
 
an unlimited community of interpretation
 
. Peirce claimed that the
possibility of endless semiosis is what gives present thought its possibility of being
true, because any knowledge or thought in the present alone apart from continued
interpretation is simply feeling rather than thought. In this sense, the reality of a self
is not its material existence per se but its intelligibility as a sign. 
Spawned in postmedieval nominalism and clock culture, modern science believed
that things could be reduced to a materialist understanding, without sufficiently
considering whether the communicative medium of signs in which this belief was rep-
resented could be irreducibly real and not simply “nominal.” Modern science lost
sight of what Peirce termed 
 
the psycho-physical uni
 
v
 
erse
 
 and how its capacity for gen-
eral habit taking, or semiosis, could engender “quasi-mind,” as Peirce put it, and an
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evolutionary development of mind and minds. Through its false nominalistic divide of
thought and things, modern science rendered itself the arbitrary figment of its stu-
dents of nature, since all knowledge in a materialistic, nominalistic outlook is merely
names for things outside knowledge. Peirce claimed that such a nominalist way of
thinking, shaving off real generality in the name of Occam’s razor, actually cuts its
own throat and ultimately renders science inexplicable. But science conceived as the
investigation of a psycho-physical universe allows that truth is not reducible to the
material particulars it involves but has as its object real, 
 
general
 
 law. Indeed, it allows
that reality is of the nature of a sign, not merely material particulars. 
As the communicative organ of the self, mind includes the pragmatic conse-
quences it engenders. Those who would identify mind as simply internal neurocog-
nitive processes falsely assume that signs are reducible to mechanical, electrochem-
ical functioning, ignoring that neural, cognitive “information” may be the material
means, but not necessarily the purport, of that which is communicated. To reduce
those consequences to “neural activity” is an example of Whitehead’s fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness.
To say that these words are just ink marks on paper (or images on a screen or
sound waves in the air), which become meaningful only when actually interpreted
by a mind, actually functioning in a working brain, would be folly. It would make
communication between minds to be an occult affair, signs suddenly springing out
of meaninglessness because some mind is now actually interpreting them in a brain
function, then shading into nullity when the function is completed. It would exclude
the object of a sign from the sign, though that object may determine the interpretation:
meaning is in the object as it is involved in its interpretive spatiotemporal environ-
ment. It would exclude the real conceivable consequences signs produce, whether
or not actually interpreted. Brain is an organ of mind, just as a bat or a keyboard can
be. The bat may be considered an “inanimate” object, but it is also an animate sign in
my example. 
You are surrounded by mind in your built environment as you read this. These
words are the true expression of my mind; they are an externalization of my mind,
“liberated,” as it were, from my neuronal activity. Neuronal activity is a bodily me-
dium for sign-activity, meaningless except insofar as it addresses a future interpret-
ing sign that it calls into being. 
All communication is through signs. A sign imparts something to its interpreter,
its interpreter may interpret or misinterpret that which is communicated. The origi-
nal sign being interpreted may itself be a misinterpretation. An interpreter may also
bring something more to the interpretation than was conveyed through the original
sign; thus, the sign may grow, and we with it, for being a human being means being
an organic sign-complex, in transaction with a universe suffused with signs. Even
private conduct is mediate, the stuff of signs, though they need not necessarily be
symbolic signs. Like all conduct they may involve iconic (or qualitative) and indexical
(or existential) signs in Peirce’s trichotomy, or “conversation of gesture” signs in
Mead’s outlook. Human biology is a natural construction of prior social experience
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meeting the social present; in this sense, all mediate biosemiosis. This is neither bio-
logical reductionism nor cultural reductionism but a biosemiotic perspective that
undercuts the old mind-versus-matter dichotomy underpinning each.
We live in and through signs, as signs live through us. Now Peirce was a physicist,
experimental psychologist, inventor of semiotic, and pragmatist who also acknowl-
edged the brute, existential aspect of matter, who arrived at the radical position that
“all matter is mind, hidebound with habit.” In this perspective the earth bodied
forth bodies literally in-formed by the general laws of nature, general laws that
were not created by those bodies but that, indeed, may have been involved in pro-
ducing those bodies. Eventually human beings were mattered out of evolving eco-
logical mind. With humans those earth-begotten bodies even became capable of
becoming conscious of such laws. 
Peirce saw through the false modern divide between thought and things in devel-
oping a view of laws of nature as objective general habits, that is, as real signs.
Hence matter, as governed by objective general habits of nature, can be regarded as
“mind, hidebound with habit” (as thirdness), even as matter in an individual event,
such as two things bumping, can also be regarded as a brute, existential instance (as
secondness). And as Peirce ([1898] 1976:143) put it elsewhere, “I am not much
afraid of specializing too much and of assuming that the universe has characters
which belong only to nervous protoplasm in a complicated organism. For we must
remember that the organism has not made the mind, but is only adapted to it. It has
become adapted to it by an evolutionary process so that it is not far from correct to
say that it is the mind that has made the organism.” 
The human mind involves determinate neural processes, yet is also the product
of indeterminate processes—the event that kills one’s parents, say, just after birth,
altering the life course and potentially the brain’s structuring. The human brain,
uniquely incomplete at birth, is also unique in being so dependent on 
 
indeterminate
 
social processes for its completion in the first years of life, its further maturity
dependent on its organic immaturity. Too much of this, too little of that, and the
biosocialization process produces a different brain. Humans are a neotenic species
(neoteny = newborn), for whom prolonged newborn characteristics were crucial to
the origins and development of human culture and the self. The developmental re-
tardation afforded emerging humans by prolonged neoteny, I would argue, is the
basis for an increasingly Lamarckian-like mode of evolution—that is, the transmis-
sion of acquired habits of conduct, namely, culture. 
Our minds are not only 
 
products
 
 of determinate evolutionary processes but most
vitally 
 
producers
 
 of emergent possibilities, actualities, and generalities not reducible
to those determinate processes. This is our little claim to being worth more than the
modern, dead gas-ball universe’s weight in gold, that we are active aspects of the ongo-
ing creation of a living universe. All that glisters is not matter but is also the stuff of
which dreams are made: signs.
Yet the modern nominalistic, rational-mechanical worldview would treat signs as
unreal, as reducible to determinate processes of matter. Such is the implication of
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Saussure’s conventionalist model and postmodern variations of it, as well as appar-
ently opposed materialist reductionism. Neither side of the great divide can encom-
pass the living quality of semiosis, of sign-action, which involves the presence and
purport of signification. Similarly, Dewey’s idea of “aesthetic quality,” or “qualitative
immediacy,” shared by Mead, is an aspect of what could be called semiotic essen-
tialism
 
 
 
in pragmatism. But it is not conceived as somehow outside social signification,
as are those forms of essentialism criticized today by postmodernists. It is social, an
element of a transaction, just as the stimulus in a “reflex-arc” is, as Dewey showed
in 1896. That is a unique contribution of pragmatism, ranging across Peirce’s “First-
ness,” his invention of phenomenology (or as he preferred, phaneroscopy), “iconic
signs” in his semiotic, and Mead’s discussions of the “consummatory” (Rochberg-
Halton 1986). In their different ways, the pragmatists mapped out a realm of mean-
ing that is neither solely instrumental nor reducible to conventions, contingencies,
or physical sensations. 
Oddly, many qualitative researchers often appeal to cognitivist and post-structural-
ist theories that cannot account for qualitative signification, including what Peirce
termed “iconic signs.” In chapter 7 (“The Transactions between Persons and Things”)
of 
 
The Meaning of Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self
 
 (Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton 1981), I drew from Peirce’s triadic semiotic a threefold way in
which to view person-object transactions, namely, (1) as aesthetic or qualitative, (2) as
attention directing, and (3) as intentional or goal directing. Using Dewey’s distinction
between 
 
perception
 
 and 
 
recognition
 
, I argued that aesthetic meaning involves a trans-
action wherein the object’s qualities enter into the interpretation, regardless of
whether the object also holds conventional meaning in the culture. The objects that
respondents most frequently described with aesthetic meaning were actually house-
plants, whose qualities they took note of in day-to-day transactions. 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s warnings in 
 
The Brothers Karamazo
 
v
 
 about the coming
time when “everything is permitted” strike me as outlining the moral equivalent of
contemporary “no fixed essence” ideology. People do have “essential characteris-
tics,” from inborn temperament or character to the inborn yet plastic resources of
our hunter-gatherer, primate, mammalian past, to the vicissitudes of accumulated ex-
perience. It is a postmodern conceit, in my opinion, to deny essences, a conceit
rooted in a misunderstanding of the nature of “essences.” Such a view ignores the
ways that qualities can act as qualitative signs, thoroughly social and communicative.
The denial of inborn and naturally developed ingredients of the self stems from a
kind of intellectualism that considers human conduct only from the neck up. 
To those of the “top-down” view of humankind’s place on earth, consider a “bottom-
up” view: the possibility of institutional selfhood, of social consciousness and spiritual
consciousness incarnated in the human mind through its individual participants. Mead
demonstrated how the individual self is an internalized community. A semiotic view
also allows the inverse: how external communities can act as genuine selves, living in
and through individual members. And from that perspective, perhaps dogs are to us as
we are to such institutions, serving them for whole lifetimes for good or bad. 
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Dogs and cats are artifacts of human domestication, bent toward human pur-
poses in their genetic constitution. As such they participate in the human mind and
are physical emanations mattered, in part, from it. But humans are also primates
and mammals, universally bent toward primate and mammal characteristics in some
of our deepest activities, activities from which the human self springs, such as
mother-infant bonding and separation: the milk of mammal kindness. Nurture is in
our nature even as nature is in our nurture. As such, we participate in the primate
and mammalian mind even as it lives through and participates in us.
 
MODALITIES OF THE SELF-TRANSCENDING BODY-MIND
 
Modern materialism divides mind and body, yet they form a psycho-physical unity.
Let us consider how the human body-mind is a sign-complex not only not limited to
the individual physical body but organically designed to transcend it. I begin with
those composite modalities of self I have termed 
 
the personal self
 
,
 
 the social self
 
, and
 
the cosmic self
 
, and then reveal a new wrinkle on how “out of body” experiences are
basic to the organic body-mind. 
The personal self consists not only of those sign-habits that comprise one’s sense
of self but also of the objects of those sign-habits. A sporting or musical activity can
be a key ingredient in the self, represented by signs external to the body yet internal
to the self. To put this differently, the generalized other can be found not only in
mental representations but in physical representations as well. 
A baseball bat, soccer ball, or guitar is just as much an embodiment of mind as
these words are. Like you and like me, that bat, ball, or guitar is a sign, and the
meanings of signs—the stuff of which mind is made—are found in the conceivable
consequences they generate. The bats that the baseball player Sammy Sosa used as
a kid were signs and instruments that helped engender the mature batting self of
Sammy. Indeed, a marketed bat with the name “Sammy Sosa” can serve as a role
model and genuine sign of the self of the child who uses and dreams with it. 
Persons and things cocultivate each other through sign-activities. A batless Sosa
is like a paintless Picasso: the public self of each can be found in the thing-signs as
much or more as in the physical, animate organism. That is not to say that the per-
sonal self is not also a bounded self. For a healthy self is one aware of its differenti-
ation from its significant environment as well as its empathic connections, through
boundaries biosocially constructed in early childhood, especially during the mother-
infant bonding and separation phase. Such a self is capable of self-determination, in
contrast to, say, a codependent self. But there is more to the self than this.
Though the physical bodies of individual interpreters may die, the embodied
signs of their lives may persist in continued interpretation. Even the personal self
can live on in the memories of those it has touched, and in this sense combines ele-
ments of Peirce’s carnal consciousness and social consciousness. The social self co-
lives in the person and the society or institutions surrounding the person and may
continue to live on through that society. It is a way to view the self from the social,
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rather than individual, perspective, and in which the individual is a member. For
example, we partake of the “society” of intellectuals, which will continue on after
we depart individually. Consider the words of Charles Horton Cooley (1907:97–109)
on social consciousness: “Common-sense, moderately informed, assures us that
the individual has his being only as a part of a whole. What does not come by he-
redity comes by communication and intercourse; and the more closely we look, the
more apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of the eye and community the
inner truth. ‘Social organism’—using the term in no technical sense, but merely to
mean a vital unity in human life—is a fact as obvious to enlightened commonsense
as individuality.”
The cosmic self is that portion of the creation, discovery, and embodiment of the
reasonableness of the universe, characteristic of humanity’s need to question the
universe and discover its meanings through religion, art, science, and other human
practices.
This cosmic self, so crucial to humankind all the way up through medieval culture
and the apparently well-known person of that time named “Anonymous,” would
seem to have gone into eclipse with the rise of modern individualism, yet it remains a
real potential of self-development, of that “energizing reasonableness that shapes
phenomena in some sense . . . this same working reasonableness [that] has molded the
reason of man into something like its own image,” as Peirce (1998:68) put it. In short,
mind matters itself into emergent being, when one reconceives the universe as a psycho-
physical universe, suffused with signs. 
Einstein didn’t “own” 
 
In
 
v
 
ariententheorie
 
, the theory of relativity, he discovered
it, yet though it may be imperfect, from this point of view we may say that this cos-
mic dimension of his self, this idea, continues to produce real consequences in the
world through its (however imperfect) connection to reality, even though Einstein
the man who bodied the idea forth and his pickled brain are long since dead. One
might say that signs of Einstein’s cosmic self helped mind atomic bombs, transistors,
and perhaps the electronic age into matter. 
Of this cosmic dimension of the self it might be said that we live in it more than
that it lives in us. Indeed, one might say that where one possesses a personal self, one
copossesses a social self and is possessed of a cosmic self. The cosmic self, as I am call-
ing it, originated in human attunement to, and marveling in, the all-surrounding signs
of life. Through those processes and practices animate mind evolved into what Paul
Shepard described as the wild Pleistocene bodies we retain today, despite the ten-
thousand-year civilized veneer. This is what William Blake means in saying that “the
Primeval State of Man, was Wisdom, Art, and Science.” What is science, after all, if
not the human attunement to, and marveling in, the all-surrounding signs of nature?
Modern culture has opened up possibilities for the personal self, through things
such as the expansion of privacy, or even the invention of the novel and its interior-
ity, even as it expanded the possibilities of depersonalization. But it has done so
seemingly at the expense of devaluing the cosmic self. Yet there may be counterex-
amples. In my opinion, the Faust bargain with Mephistopheles may be seen as the
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willingness to sell out the personal self and its responsibilities in order for one’s en-
ergies to be absorbed by the cosmic dimension, by a kind of egoless self-absorption
that can produce great works and tragic personal lives. Herman Melville and Peirce
are two examples that come to mind. They raise the question of what the right bal-
ance should be. Neither rugged individualism, cut from cosmos, nor the urge to
merge into the All at any cost seems balanced. 
Consider three touchstones of human nature that reveal how being a self in-
volves organic “out of body” experiences of the self-transcending body-mind. We
primates are born out of our mammalian ancestry and its great achievements of
mother-infant bonding and separation, REM dreaming, and play. These are not
merely human or even primate but mammalian achievements, yet also manifesta-
tions of our human biosemiotic essence. All three are ecstatic, engaged, out-of-
body experiences crucial to the human self and the conduct of life (Halton 1995).
 
5
 
 
Mother-infant bonding and separation, the mammary connection of the new-
born, not yet itself, selected through evolution to be born prematurely because of
its big brain, an in-utero-level primate ex utero, still in living connection with its
mother, in its own body and in hers, in milk-need, in touch-need, in the gaze of em-
pathy, in play, in learning in the world in ways that enter its strange in utero, ex
utero big, premature brain. In short, simply being a baby is being in an in-and-out-
of-body experience!
REM dreaming comes close to waking consciousness, yet remains so far from it.
In REM we are utterly locked in paralysis in our body, motor capacities virtually
shut off, yet we experience the world fantastically, as though utterly out of our
locked-down body. When our dead speak to us from the dreamtime, we are utterly
locked out of our body from the inside, yet not, in time that is not, yet seems to be.
If REM is not an “out-of-body experience,” what is? 
A dream is a projection, an energetic projaculation, a throwing forth of a quasi-
narrative, a tripping the inner light fantastic, in which the “higher functions” of the
neocortex—the new brain—are actively connected in at least one way to the rep-
tile-demons-of-the-deep in us, in our old brain, through electro-chemical-chimerical
pathways in which dance our dreaming energies, dowsing us with demons and
dreads, dogging us with paleomammalian visions from the “smell-brain” or limbic
system, imaging our internal evolutionary archive in a glorious, communal, brain-
purging, and ecstatically sacramental nightly game. Dreaming is a biocultural game
we must play: as mammal need because without dreaming we soon lose tempera-
ture control and other functions of our bodies and die; and as mammal delight be-
cause we are also the stuff of which dreams are made, and every now and then
comes a dream not just from the inner brain cleanser but from a source capable of
arousing the soul, and that dream demands attention to our inner life (Halton
1992:119–39). 
Consider 
 
play
 
. We all play, so much so that Johannes Huizinga ([1938] 1971)
characterized humans as 
 
homo ludens
 
, the human player. The “higher” the mammal,
the more it plays—at least until the increased work ethic of agricultural civilization,
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and then more recently, the modern, rationalizing work consciousness, bent on
its clockwork. Yet those transformations of consciousness, the forebrain foam of
human cerebration, exist on the much deeper play consciousness of our hunter-
gatherer, primate, aping-around bodies. And playing is a way of being out of
your body in its actual environment and into your play body playing wherever it
will. When you play that you are an animal, whose body is it in the play? What is
the bodily meaning of being cat-dog-bird-bear? Again, as Shepard (1986b)
pointed out, the animals are truly the mind’s first eye, the first Other through whom
we became human, not only by close observation and hunting but also through
ritual and play enactments, participations in which we “internalized” the life of
the animal. 
The self-transcending body-mind also manifests through semiosis more gener-
ally, our communicative capacities, minding into matter. I am here, literally in trans-
action with you in these word signs, truly and in reality out of my body, though not
out of my mind (one hopes, dear reader!). The “out-of-body experience” of the
shaman, dancing-trancing-dreaming to inner realities of psyche and brain not avail-
able to verbal consciousness, journeys that elicit condescending rational explana-
tion in modern materialist consciousness, is only one of the ways. But to deny the
out-of-body experience, oh, that is sure suicide for bodies designed to transcend
themselves, as ours, I claim, are. 
What are shamans, who traditionally are trained to inhabit those image-laden
liminal zones of dream-consciousness not available to linguistic mind, if not those
creatures living the signs between the human and the greater inner and outer
worlds of life and spirit? The shaman is intermediary between worlds, a healer
whose job description is the connection and periodic reconciliation of those worlds.
This involves a great awareness of medicinal plants, as well as of emotionally me-
dicinal ritual practices. When the clan is screwing up, the locus of its problems is felt
to be in its relation to the larger life in which it is embedded, and the shaman is the
intermediary through whom things are put right. Today we like to say “individual”
far more than “clan” or “family,” and psychological far more than “psycho-environ-
mento-spiritual,” but the same role can be found today, whether we call it therapist
or reverend (Abram 1997; Keeney 1999, 2003; Shostack [1983] 2000). Take the
psychotherapist Leslie Gray’s view of ecopsychology as incorporating selective
techniques of shamanism. Despite only including partial aspects, it still includes as
necessary “the worldview of shamanism—that health is defined as a balanced rela-
tionship with your habitat, your ecosystem. This kind of relating empowers you as
well as the ecosystem” (Gray 1995:181). 
What if the modern era and its earnest scientists have been unwittingly working
for the myth of the machine, projecting the subjective clockwork culture of their
time onto the objective universe, truly discovering with the precision of Blake’s
painting of Newton, the truth of the single-visioned part, while sacrificing the vision
of the whole reality? Blake pictures Newton utterly engaged in 
 
The Ratio
 
, bent over
and fixated on his compass, oblivious to all-surrounding life. 
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The culture that produced 
 
The Origin of Species
 
 in 1859 and decades of debate
over it also had a viability rate at two years for newborns placed in orphanages in the
United States of about zero percent. They almost all died, not from lack of nutrition
but from simple lack of touch, a problem that also manifested in European hospi-
tals. As Ashley Montagu (1986:97, 99) stated, “As late as the second decade of the
twentieth century the death rate for infants under one year of age in various found-
ling institutions throughout the United States was nearly 100 percent. It was in 1915
that Dr. Henry Dwight Chapin, the distinguished New York pediatrician, in a report
on children’s institutions in ten different cities made the staggering disclosure that
in all but one institution every infant under two years of age had died. . . . What the
child requires if it is to prosper, it was found, is to be handled, and carried, and ca-
ressed, and cuddled, and cooed to, even if it isn’t breastfed.” It wasn’t until the late
1920s that medical practitioners began to understand the life-and-death importance
of touch for newborns. Why would we think that a culture so disengaged, a bubble
boy culture so literally out of touch with life in caring for infants, should be less out
of touch in its understanding of the social realities involved in evolution and human
culture?
 
ECOLOGICAL MINDING MATTERS
 
The shapes of beauty haunting our moments of inspiration . . . [are] a
people older than the world, citizens of eternity.
 
—William Butler Yeats
 
What mysterious creatures we are, who take time and space and transform them
into tangible memories in our makings and doings. We mind matter into being. We
were minded into being ourselves, following an odd trajectory of increasingly pro-
longed neoteny. The more childlike we became, the more plastic our learning ca-
pacity became. That increasing learning capacity found itself bigger brains, literally
more convoluted. But those big brains required an “exit” strategy to be born. We
needed to brain ourselves prematurely into the world, completing brain growth in
the first two years of life that was undergone in utero for most other mammals. 
We minded our way to becoming true children of the earth, dependent on bioso-
cial nurturance to complete the self-construction of our brains. “The milk of human
kindness” found through the touch and gaze and empathic bonding and then sepa-
ration from the mother concerned far more than nutrition, it involved the comple-
tion of a brain capable of attuning to and loving life. 
That trajectory required an increasingly omnivorous attention to and engagement
with the circumambient signs of life for achieving mature minds, signs that could con-
vey complex information about the habitat from the organisms that conveyed them.
That trajectory also afforded us the gift of guessing, of an instinctive power of conjec-
ture, of sensing the gap between the instinctive intelligence of life around us and our
own doubting cogitation. We evolved into trackers of life-signs, fully engaged. With
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civilization and modern life, we learned, in effect, ways to “disengage” from these ca-
pacities, of “progressively” weighting conduct toward rational institutions and modes
of conduct. But the sources of engagement remain indelibly and ineradicably rooted
in the human genome and in the passages of human development. Eradicate them
and you eradicate us. 
Contemporary globalizing consumption culture seems to me precisely engaged
in disengaging humanity from the primal sources of engagement of the human
body-mind. How? Its rules of engagement are to provide virtual substitute forms of
emotions, experiences, and relationships in media, diet, and lifestyle, whose effects
are to deplete people of their own indigenous sources of engagement, self-originated
experience, and identity (Halton 2008). In this sense, modern materialism has been
a kind of installation of an “out of body” worldview in a pathological sense, displacing
the engaged body-mind by materialist mentalism.
Elephants possess far greater memory capacities than humans, and exhibit
mourning. We began writing and making books to enlarge our memories and
minds, though Socrates claimed, with good cause, that writing subverts memory and
living thought. In effect, one might say that we booked from life, basing beliefs on
fetishized texts, which reduced the living quick of life to dead “sacred” histories: lit-
erary elephantiasis of the human mind, which it pleases us to call civilization.
Traditional hunter-gatherer peoples, rightly in my opinion, view the intelligence of
other animals as greater than that of humans. They understand that the community of
instinctive intelligence is our passport to maturity, the original generalized other
through which we degenerate monkeys, slackened from our instinctive determina-
tions, found our maturity over evolutionary time through close attunement. They ap-
preciate the relatively greater intelligence of the living ecological mind compared
with the human mind, as our sciences have begun to do as well, even if still trapped in
the myth of the machine (Halton 2007; Mumford 1970; Shepard [1982] 1998a). 
The presence of animals still remains pronounced in the earliest civilizations in
stories, myths, and rituals, though gradually fading as anthropocentrism (and espe-
cially later in monotheism) makes the human other increasingly central to the mind’s
eye, even when projected onto a god. The loss of that attunement to the wild other
during agricultural civilizing and especially in the modern myth of the machine is to
my mind a key symptom of our lunge toward the finish . . . of the human race. We
lack the instinctive maturity that the wild Others provided, as portals to ecological
mind without and to our own primate-mammalian-reptilian-stratified brain within. 
How can one be aware of the extrahuman parts of the human brain-mind without
the direct experiential familiarity with the animals and plants through whose ecologi-
cal mind we evolved ours? They are the original object of the mind’s eye, as Shepard
argued. To put it in more familiar terms, the wild others are the original role models
of the generalized other, through whom humans derived the significant symbols of rit-
ual life, dancing and rhythming and singing them, impersonating them, hunting and
gathering them, ingesting them, ruminating on them, and incorporating them into
human identity and social life. Without the wild Others we are less than human: the
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process of “de-animalization” from them, associated with domestication and civilizing
settlement, marks the beginning of dehumanization (Halton 2006).
In 2 million years the ape that became us walked a long way. But in becoming civi-
lized in the last 10,000 years, that ape may have walked into a cul-de-sac with a no-exit
sign posted: anthropocentrism. Its human-centered and more recently machine-
centered simulacra of the wild Others, its deities, heroes, human, and machine con-
ceptions of the universe, religious and scientific, have not only not yet attained the
maturity of ecological mind but have done much to destroy it globally (Halton 2007).
Should that ape escape its cage (which looks to me doubtful), where will the next
2 million years lead? As D. H. Lawrence (1936:706–7) put it, “Man is a queer beast.
He spends dozens of centuries puffing himself up and drawing himself in, and at last
he has to be content to be just his own size, neither infinitely big nor infinitely little.” 
So where does that leave us? I have argued that seriously considering the various
modalities of self, from evolutionary requirements of human development to the
social constructions of history and institutions and of personal development, re-
quires a full-bodied understanding of semiosis as the living bridge between mind
and matter, biology and culture. To be a self is not only to be an inner community of
the generalized other, or “me,” in conversation with the living moment, or “I.” It is
also to be involved in broader communities that can be regarded as selves, and of
which our relatively individual self is an organ, a member. 
Peirce argued that science lives and breathes in the reality of general signs, that
nominalistic science needs to reconsider the place of final causality in science, that
final causality is logically required, and that it can be viewed as the unlimited com-
munity of inquirers to whom all scientific claims and experimental phenomena are
addressed, conditionally fated to arrive at the truth of things. Reality is thus intrinsi-
cally social, attainable in science through an unlimited community of inquirers
capable of self-correcting inquiry into the indefinite future. 
Such considerations of the place of real signs—or generals—and their purposes
in science, let alone life more generally, raise basic questions about the underlying
assumptions of modern civilization that matter is completely separate from mind.
What if that entire legacy of the mechanistic worldview has holes in it, such that
those qualities of life, such as spontaneity, imagination, freedom, are phenomenal
realities of this world falsely excluded by excessive reductionism: a Procrustean
bed, lopping life in the name of the machine?
Once exposed, the vast edifice of scientific, materialist civilization reveals its hidden
lie: that far from excluding final purpose or entelechy from the nature of things, it has
merely replaced the Aristotelian telos with a rational-mechanical one. For what the
clockwork of modern consciousness most desires is that which it destroys: our sponta-
neous life as children of the earth, dreaming into being in the flow of organic time.
Mind indeed matters, matters into being, when one reconceives the basis of mind
and matter in the general semiotic philosophy I have outlined here. The modern
conceit that mind is reducible to matter, or that mind is utterly ethereal, a mere
ghost in the machine, is shown to be an illusion rooted in the false outlook of
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nominalism. The reality in which the human body-mind finds itself is a psycho-phys-
ical universe alive with signs. 
We evolved into human beings by attuning to these signs of ecological intelli-
gence; we developed into agricultural civilization and later the modern mechanical
worldview by changing the rules, by assuming that the human mind knew more
than the ecological mind on which it depended, and could control it. Yet like the
gangster murdered by the mob, it might be said that so-called Homo sapiens “knew
too much” and may be poised to go down from having lost touch with the life of
signs, locked in a ghost-in-the machine view at odds with nature’s requirements. 
The Peircean semiotic outlook, applied to an understanding of social life, pro-
vides a new and full-bodied understanding of semiosis as the bridge between mind
and matter, and human biology and culture. The biosemiotic approach I have out-
lined here casts light on the individual as alive in composite modalities of self that
surpass the physical creature even while also bodying forth from the organic condi-
tions of the body-mind. Such an outlook reveals that indeed, mind matters, and in
ways that suggest much more comprehensive understandings of the nature of the
“symbolic” in symbolic interaction than those who consider themselves to be sym-
bolic interactionists have thus far considered. Symbols live, as do signs more gener-
ally, as Peirce reminded us. And so do we, through them.
NOTES
1. Peirce is responsible for resurrecting the realism-nominalism controversy and was already writ-
ing about it in the late 1860s. The term reality, like many other terms, was inverted in the rise of
modern consciousness. It meant a true general for those medieval scholastic realist philoso-
phers who invented the Latin terms realis and realitas, but came to mean individual particulars
of existence in the philosophy of nominalism developed by William of Ockham (1285–1349),
and nominalism came to dominate modern philosophy. In denying the reality of signs (or gen-
erals), modern “scientific realism,” or positivism, inverted the original meaning of realism
(Rochberg-Halton 1983). 
Early nominalists, following the via moderna of William of Ockham, claimed that reality
could be found only in knowledge of particulars, that general laws are fictions or conventions,
and that conventions are simply names for particulars, hence nominal. Nominalism in effect
created two worlds by driving a wedge between thought and things, then faced the problem of
how to put them together, the problem of modern philosophy. Thus arose the great divide that
has come to characterize modern culture. 
Much in the rise of modern science involves the overthrow of Aristotle: Galileo showed how
Aristotle’s idealized physics does not hold up in empirical observation. Thomas Hobbes,
schooled by nominalist theology, was impressed with Galileo and the spirit of science, and even
met with an old, blind, postcensored Galileo. Hobbes applied nominalism to the political
realm, claiming that human social life is but a social contract, or convention, laid over an antiso-
cial nature. This is the inversion of Aristotle’s idea that man is by nature zoon politikon, a polit-
ical animal, determined to live the good life in community. The result is a subnatural theory of
nature, incapable of conceiving general relation as real. Modern “realism” is a subnatural the-
ory of nature, sliced from reality by Occam’s razor, and spawned from clock culture. It is the
myth of materialism, ticking, with precision, into the nature of things while excluding the gen-
eral sign relations as the whole from which precise facts are sliced.
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2. By the strange meanderings of modern philosophy, George Herbert Mead remained an active
presence in sociology while becoming virtually forgotten in philosophy. Even after the reintro-
duction of Dewey and pragmatism into philosophy since the 1960s, Mead remains marginal in
philosophy. This is as unwarranted as its opposite: the overvalued place of Mead to sociologists as
the chief representative of pragmatism. I expressed this some years ago as “the Meadian is no
longer the mode.” If sociologists were to take seriously the pragmatists’ idea of a community of
interpretation as the basis of thought, they could perhaps realize that Mead’s ideas should be un-
derstood as part of that larger school of thought. But that would require revamping the textbook-
indoctrinated preconceptions that prevail among academic sociologists, whether or not they are
symbolic interactionists. I stopped holding my breath for that one a long time ago.
Both Peirce and Mead share themes common to the pragmatists: thought as an internal dia-
logue, meaning as processual habit, the self as a process of self-controlled conduct, qualitative
immediacy or aesthetic meaning as an element of communicative conduct. Mead’s writings stress
social-psychological dimensions; Peirce’s primary concerns were with logic, especially the develop-
ment of logic considered as semiotic. For a more systematic discussion of parallels and differences
between Peirce, Mead, and the other pragmatists, see my book Meaning and Modernity.
3. Though Mead’s view of mind undercut the great divide, it remains narrower in scope than
Peirce’s. Mead (1934:47) held that mind requires significant symbols, the stuff of reflective cog-
nition. But Peirce ascribed mind to signs more generally, not limiting it to a self capable of tak-
ing the role of the other but to the “living inferential metaboly” inherent in semiosis per se. A
beehive could be an embodiment of mind in Peirce’s view, but not Mead’s, even though the in-
telligence that evolved the hexagonal cell architecture was not conscious. 
In 1908 Peirce (1931–34:6.456) distinguished an argument as “any process of thought reason-
ably tending to produce a definite belief” from argumentation as involving habits of self-control,
so that argumentation is “an argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premises.”
Mead’s significant symboling theory of mind would be argumentation in this sense. But beehives
and other forms of organic or habitual intelligence, in Peirce’s perspective, are genuine argu-
ments manifesting intelligence and, as such, genuine manifestations of mind. He even intro-
duced a broader category of the “quasi-mind” as a bearer of semiotic information: “Thought is
not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and through-
out the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the col-
ors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. . . . Not only is thought in the organic world, but
it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there
cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give ‘Sign’ a very wide sense, no doubt, but not
too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a
Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs re-
quire at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two
are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign
they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a neces-
sity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic” (Peirce 1931–34:4.551).
4. Norbert Wiley (1994, 2006) has addressed this dialogical nature of the self, as has Vincent
Colapietro (1989).
5. Phillip Vannini and Dennis Waskul (2006:188–200) have recently explored transactional,
ecstatic, semiotic, and qualitative approaches to the body. 
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